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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Since entering the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) in 2011, Kawhi Leonard has 
gradually become one of the best professional basketball players in the world. 1  After being 
drafted by the San Antonio Spurs in 2011, Leonard quickly made a name for himself by 
becoming one of the youngest players ever to win an NBA championship and be awarded the 
Bill Russell NBA Finals Most Valuable Player (“MVP”) Award  in 2014.2  Leonard also joined 
the ranks of NBA legends by also winning the NBA’s Defensive Player of the Year Award.3  
Most recently, in 2019, Leonard again earned himself a spot amongst elite NBA company by 
winning the NBA championship with the Toronto Raptors and becoming only the third player in 
league history to win the Finals MVP Award with two different teams.4  
 While accomplishing these many feats, Leonard has become popularly known by his 
nickname, “The Klaw.” 5  Leonard has been referred to as “The Klaw” because of his incredible 
skills on the defensive end of the court and his uniquely massive hands, which greatly aid his 
defensive prowess. 6  This nickname has become so much a part of Leonard’s identity that it has 
been incorporated into his personal logo, which he uses on all of his merchandise.7  Recently, 
this logo has given rise to a lawsuit between Leonard and Nike, Inc. (“Nike”) over ownership of 
the intellectual property. 8  The issue in this case stems from Leonard receiving a trademark 
registration for the logo from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, while Nike had formally 
secured copyright protection of the logo by registering it with the U.S. Copyright Office in 
Washington D.C.9  The filing of this lawsuit raises many questions, the most pressing of which 
being the determination of intellectual property ownership when opposing parties have 
competing interests granted to them by the U.S. Copyright Office and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office. 
 This lawsuit between Leonard and Nike, Inc. will be the focus of this Comment, which  
will be broken up into four parts.  Following this introduction in Part I,  Part II will provide 
background on current trademark and copyright law and the procedures that one must adhere to 
in order to gain protection by either the U.S. Copyright Office or the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.  Part II will also detail the right of publicity and explain what goes into making a right of 
publicity claim.  Further, Part II will lay the factual foundation for Leonard’s lawsuit against 
 
1 Kawhi Leonard Biography Facts, Childhood, and Personal Life, Sporty Tell. (Nov. 27, 2019), 
https://sportytell.com/basketball/kawhi-leonard-biography-facts-childhood-personal-life/  
2 The NBA Finals MVP award was established in 1969 and is awarded to the best player on the winning team in the 
NBA Finals. See NBA Awards: Finals MVP, Land of Basketball. (Nov. 27, 2019), 
https://www.landofbasketball.com/awards/nba_finals_mvp_players.htm  
3 The NBA Defensive Player of the Year Award is awarded to one player each year who proves to be the best 
defensively. Kawhi Leonard became the third player in NBA history to win both NBA Defensive Player of the Year 
Award and NBA Finals MVP. See Sporty Tell. (Nov. 27, 2019) https://sportytell.com/basketball/kawhi-leonard-
biography-facts-childhood-personal-life/  
4 Kawhi Leonard Joins Elite Company in Winning Finals MVP, NBA.com Staff. (Nov. 27, 2019). 
https://www.nba.com/article/2019/06/13/finals-mvps-more-one-team  
5 Sporty Tell. (Nov. 27, 2019) https://sportytell.com/basketball/kawhi-leonard-biography-facts-childhood-personal-
life/  
6 Kawhi Leonard Nicknames: Meanings Behind “Qui” and “The Claw,” Heavy. (Nov. 27, 2019). 
https://heavy.com/sports/2019/05/kawhi-leonard-nicknames-qui-claw-meanings/  
7 Id.  
8 Nike Countersues Kawhi in an Ongoing Battle Over The Klaw Logo, Sports Illustrated. (Nov. 27. 2019) 
https://www.si.com/nba/2019/07/19/kawhi-leonard-clippers-nike-new-balance-klaw-logo 
9 Id.  
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Nike, as well as other NBA athletes’ intellectual property disputes.  Specifically, it will examine 
Shaquille O’Neal’s lawsuit over his likeness being used for “Shaqtus,” the Indianapolis Colts’ 
lawsuit for trademark infringement over the Baltimore CFL Colts name, and the Baltimore 
Orioles’ lawsuit combatting the MLB’s Players Association’s right of publicity claim.  Part III 
will analyze current trademark and copyright law and discuss how Leonard’s lawsuit against 
Nike, Inc. could have been resolved.  Part III will also discuss a possible right of publicity claim 
that Leonard could potentially have attempted to use to save his ownership interest.  
Additionally, Part III will discuss how the judge ruled on Leonard’s case and explain his 
remaining options.  Finally, Part IV will discuss the possible impact that Leonard’s lawsuit will 
have on athletes and intellectual property law at large, as well as discuss what changes should be 
made to the system to alleviate future confusion.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 This section will provide an overview of the relevant copyright law and trademark law, as 
well as the right of publicity.  In addition, it will examine the factual circumstances surrounding 
Kawhi Leonard’s lawsuit against Nike, Inc., as well as lawsuits involving other professional 
athletes and organizations’ disputes over intellectual property.  
A. Copyright Law 
Copyright law originates from the U.S. Constitution Art. I § 8, representing the founding 
fathers’ recognition of rights protecting authors and original expression.10  Since then, Congress 
has codified the laws surrounding copyrights in Title 17 of the United States Code Service.11 
Section 102 of Title 17 provides that, “copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”12  Works of authorship can include: writings, 
music, videos, pictures, and a variety of other original works that are placed in a fixed tangible 
medium.13  Copyright protection provides the owner with exclusive rights to reproduce the work, 
distribute copies of the work, and publicly display the work.14  Copyrights further grant an author 
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the original work.15 
Copyrights are automatic, meaning that one obtains a copyright the second they put the 
original work in tangible form.16  This means that one does not need to obtain formal registration 
 
10 Corrie Lynn Rosen, Trademarks vs. Copyrights: Which one is right for you? (Nov. 27, 2019) 
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/trademarks-vs-copyrights-which-one-is-right-for-you 
11 17 U.S.C.S.  
12 17 U.S.C.S. § 102  
13 Id. a “fixed tangible medium” means the work must be established in some fixed form such as a book, print, 
dramatic work, film, etc.  Corrie Lynn Rosen, Trademarks vs. Copyrights: Which one is right for you? (Nov. 27, 
2019) https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/trademarks-vs-copyrights-which-one-is-right-for-you 
14 17 U.S.C.S. § 106(1)-(6).  
15 Id.; A Derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting works. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101. 
16 Rick Meisher, Kawhi Leonard v. Nike, Inc.: How copyrights can trump trademarks? (Nov. 27, 2019) 
https://www.technologylawsource.com/2019/06/articles/intellectual-property-1/copyright/kawhi-leonard-v-nike-inc-
how-copyrights-can-trump-trademarks/; A work is fixed in a “tangible form” when its embodiment, by or under the 
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of a copyright within the United States Copyright Office in order to have their original work 
protected.  If one wishes to obtain formal registration, an application must be sent to the United 
States Copyright Office for approval.17  In the application, a person seeking formal registration 
must include: copies of the work, their name and address, a title for the work, and the year in 
which creation was completed.18  If the claimant is not the author, they must submit a statement 
explaining how they received ownership of the work.19  If the work was a “work made for hire,” 
then the claimant must also submit a statement indicating such.20 
If, after reviewing the applicant’s submissions, the U.S. Copyright Office determines that 
the material submitted constitutes a work that is copyrightable, the office will register the work 
and issue the applicant a certificate of registration.21  While a copyright exists the second an 
author places the work in a fixed tangible medium, formally registering the work provides 
multiple benefits including: a public record of ownership, a presumption of ownership, quicker 
access to the courts for handling of disputes, and eligibility for statutory damages, attorney fees, 
and costs of suit.22 
 Congress has spelled out multiple ways in which people can come into ownership of a 
copyright.  Initial ownership of a copyright is given to the author or authors at the time the work 
is created.23  If two or more people collaborate to make a joint work, they are deemed to be co-
owners of the copyright in the work.24  When dealing with “works made for hire,” unless the 
parties have expressly agreed to something different in writing, the employer is considered the 
owner of the work and the copyrights.25  Thus, while ownership of copyrights typically vests in 
the original author of the work, it is possible for someone to gain ownership of a copyright for a 
work they did not create.  Ownership of a copyright may be transferred to someone else by 
means of a conveyance or by the creation of a right by existing legal principles, otherwise known 
as “operation of law.”26  Aside from operation of law, no transfer of a copyright will be held as 
valid unless it is expressly spelled out in writing.27  This means that it is possible for someone to 
“sign away” their rights to ownership of a copyright by way of a contract.  
 A copyright has a predetermined life span. Typically, a copyright lasts for the entire life 
of the author, plus seventy years after the author’s death.28  A copyright in a “work made for 
 
authority of its author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101. 
17 17 U.S.C.S. § 408. 
18 17 U.S.C.S. § 409(1), § 409(6), and  § 409(7).  
19 Id. at § 409(5). 
20 Id. at § 409(4); A “work made for hire” is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101. 
21 Id. at § 410(a).  
22 Aaron K. Haar and Maria Cremi Speth, Why Register My Copyrights? The Benefits of Copyright Registration. 
(Nov. 27, 2019). http://www.jaburgwilk.com/news-publications/benefits-of-copyright-registration 
23 17 U.S.C.S. § 201(a). 
24 Id.  
25 17 U.S.C.S. § 201(b).  
26 17 U.S.C.S. § 201(d)(1); An example of operation of law is a child inheriting property from his deceased parent 
who does not have a will by virtue of the intestate succession laws of the state. Mary Randolph, Nolo, How an 
Estate Is Settled if There’s No Will: Intestate Succession. (May 7, 2020). https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/how-estate-settled-if-theres-32442.html 
27 17 U.S.C.S. § 204(a).  
28 17 U.S.C.S. § 302(a).  
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hire,” however, will expire at the earlier of ninety-five years from the date of publication or 120 
years from the date of creation.29   
 There are a variety of remedies that can be granted by the courts when infringement is 
found.30   First, a court may order an injunction preventing the infringing party from using the 
copyrighted work.31  A court could also order the destruction of all copies that infringe on the 
author’s copyright.32  An infringer may also be liable for damages, including the profits made in 
violation of the author’s copyright.33 
B. Trademark Law 
 A trademark protects names, terms, and symbols that identify and differentiate specific 
companies and their goods.34  Just as a logo is copyrightable, it is also capable of obtaining 
trademark protection because logos are often used by consumers to distinguish one company’s 
product from another’s.35  Take, for example, pairs of shoes similar in style that are the products 
of two popular, but distinct companies: Nike and Adidas. Consumers looking to purchase Nike 
shoes will typically rely on Nike’s logo to determine if they are buying the right pair.  Nike’s 
logo, the “Nike Swoosh,” is an internationally recognizable logo that allows consumers to 
identify Nike brand products.  Because logos are relied on by consumers in this manner, courts 
have determined that logos can receive trademark protection.36  
 While someone does not need to register their trademark to have protection over it, 
registering it with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will afford the owner more protection 
against improper use of the mark in commerce.37  In order to register a trademark, an applicant 
must fill out an application and file it with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.38  Similar to an 
application for a copyright, a trademark application must include information about the 
applicant’s domicile and citizenship, as well as the date of the mark’s first use, the date of the 
mark’s first use in commerce, and a depiction of the mark.39  An applicant must also verify that 
 
29 17 U.S.C.S. § 302(c). A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time; where a 
work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the 
work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate 
work. “Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, 
or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes 
of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes a “publication.” 17 U.S.C.S. § 101.  
30 Infringement is very similar to stealing. Infringement occurs anytime you are copying someone else’s original 
work without permission. Examples of copyright infringement include but are not limited to: downloading movies 
or music without proper payment for use, recording movies in a theater, and using others’ photographs in a blog 
without permission. Mary Juetten, How to Avoid Copyright Infringement (May 5, 2020). 
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/how-to-avoid-copyright-infringement 
31 17 U.S.C.S. § 502(a). 
32 17 U.S.C.S. § 503. 
33 17 U.S.C.S. § 504(a).  
34 Trademark vs Copyright: Everything You Need to Know, UpCounsel. (Nov. 30, 2019). 
https://www.upcounsel.com/trademark-vs-copyright 
35 Id.  
36 15 U.S.C.S. § 1052(d).  
37 Id.  
38 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051(a)(1). 
39 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051(a)(2). “A mark shall be deemed to be in ‘use in commerce’ on goods when (1) it is placed in 
any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays [their] associated [with] or on the tags or labels affixed, 
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the facts asserted in the application are all true.40  Included in this are the facts that the applicant 
is the rightful owner of the mark and that the mark is in use in commerce.41  Another very 
important fact that must be verified by the applicant is that, to the best of the applicant’s 
knowledge, no other person has the right to use the mark in commerce.  An applicant must also 
verify that no other person has the right to use a mark so similar to the applicant’s, that when 
used it will cause confusion, mistake, or deceit over who owns the marks.42   
A trademark will not be registered if it may falsely represent a connection with a 
person.43  Further, a mark will not be registered if it will cause confusion, mistake, or deception 
as to who really owns it when used in connection with the applicant’s goods.44  In order to ensure 
that the mark in question is in compliance with all of these requirements, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office uses an “examiner” to look into the mark and determine if the applicant is the 
rightful person to register it.45  A registered trademark will last 10 years after being filed and 
must be renewed every 10 years for the owner to retain registered protection.46  This means a 
trademark can last forever as long as it is continuously renewed.  
An important entity within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board.  The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board consists of the Director of the U.S 
Patent and Trademark Office, the Deputy Director, the Commissioner for Patents, the 
Commissioner for Trademarks, and an administrative trademark judge appointed by the 
Secretary of Commerce and Director.47  All cases involving the rights and registration of 
trademarks can be brought before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.48  For instance, if an 
examiner determines that the applicant is not the rightful person to register the mark, the 
applicant may appeal that decision to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.49  If dissatisfied 
with the decision of the Director or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, an applicant can appeal 
issues even further to a United States Court of Appeals.50   
There are multiple remedies that can be offered when a trademark is infringed upon.51  A 
trademark owner who believes its mark is being infringed upon may file a lawsuit in either state 
or federal court for trademark infringement.52  First, in order to be able to recover for 
infringement, a registrant must provide notice that the mark is registered.53  This is done by 
 
or….on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and (2) the goods are sold or transported in commerce.” 
“Commerce” means all commerce which may be lawfully regulated by Congress.  15 U.S.C.S § 1127  
40 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051(a)(3).  
41 Id. at § 1051(a)(3)(A)-(C).  
42 Id. at § 1051(a)(3)(D).  
43 15 U.S.C.S. §  1052(a). 
44 Id. at § 1052(d).  
45 15 U.S.C.S. § 1062.  
46 15 U.S.C.S. § 1058 
47 15 U.S.C.S. § 1067 
48 Id. 
49 15 U.S.C.S. § 1070.  
50 15 U.S.C.S. § 1071.  
51 A trademark is infringed upon by the unauthorized use of the trademark in connection with goods or services in a 
manner that is likely to cause confusion, deception, or mistake about the source of the goods and/or services. United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, About Trademark Infringement, (May 7, 2020). 
https://www.uspto.gov/page/about-trademark-infringement 
52 Id. 
53 15 U.S.C.S. § 1111. 
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explicitly saying so or placing the certified registered mark “®” “R” enclosed within a circle next 
to the mark.54  Any person who uses a registered mark in commerce without the consent of the 
registrant will be subject to civil damages.55  It must be shown that the acts have been committed 
with knowledge that the use of the mark is intended to cause confusion, mistake, or deception.56  
 A court may grant injunctions to prevent any violations of a registrant's rights over a 
mark.57  When counterfeit marks used in the sale or distribution of goods are at issue, a court 
may grant an order for the seizure of such goods and marks involved in the violation.58  When a 
violation is found, the registrant will be entitled to damages, including profits earned by the 
defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s trademark, damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result 
of the violation, and the costs of the action.59  The court has discretion in determining what 
damages are to be awarded.60  In the case of the intentional use of a counterfeit mark, the court 
may enter an order for three times the amount of profits or damages, whichever is greater.61  A 
court may also order that all products in possession of the violator containing the registered mark 
be destroyed.62   
In all actions involving a registered mark, courts may determine the rights to a 
registration.63  This means that the courts could determine who owns a registered mark, if the 
registration of a mark should be cancelled, or if the registration of a mark should be restored.64 
Normally, registration of a mark by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office can be used as 
evidence of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.65 This will not be 
conclusive proof, however.66   If it is determined that a mark has been registered in the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office through fraud or deceit, the registrant responsible for the fraud or 
deceit will be liable to any person who was harmed for any damages suffered.67  
The owner of a mark which becomes so famous or distinctive, either inherently or over 
time, may be entitled to an injunction against a person who uses a mark in commerce that is 
likely to cause dilution of the mark, regardless of whether or not there is actual confusion, 
competition, or economic injury.68  A mark is considered “famous” if it is widely recognized by 
the consumers of the U.S. as a source of the goods or services offered by the mark’s owner.69  
“Dilution by blurring” occurs by the similarity between a mark and a famous mark that impairs 
 
54 Id.  
55 15 U.S.C.S. § 1114(1).  
56 Id.  
57 15 U.S.C.S. § 1116(a).  
58 Id. at § 1116(D)(1)(A). A “Counterfeit Mark” is defined as “a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the 
principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for sale, 
or distributed and that is in use, whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so 
registered.” Id. at § 1116(D)(1)(B)(i).  
59 15 U.S.C.S. § 1117(a).  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at § 1117(b). 
62 15 U.S.C.S. § 1118.  
63 15 U.S.C.S. § 1119.  
64 Id.  
65 15 U.S.C.S. § 1115(a).  
66 Id.  
67 15 U.S.C.S. § 1120. 
68 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c)(1).  
69 Id. at 1125(c)(2)(A).  
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the distinctiveness of the famous mark.70  Courts will look to multiple factors when determining 
dilution of a mark, including the degree of similarity between the mark and the famous mark, the 
degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark, the extent to which the owner 
of the famous mark is engaged in the exclusive use of the mark, the degree of recognition of the 
mark, and any actual association between the mark and the famous mark.71  Trademark dilution 
involves a mark that is in connection with goods or services that do not compete with those in 
connection to the famous mark.72  For example, trademark dilution laws may prevent a 
harmonica maker from using the name “Ferrari,” even though no one would confuse the 
harmonicas for the cars.73 
C. Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity relates to a legally-recognizable right in a celebrity’s identity 
value.74  The right of publicity, like a copyright, protects a form of intellectual property that 
society deems to have some social utility.75  The right of publicity was first recognized in 1953 
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a case involving exclusive rights to a baseball 
player’s photograph used on trading cards.76  There, the Court held that the right of publicity was 
a property right that was assignable and licensable like any other intellectual property right.77  
Legal protections for the right of publicity exist under two broad areas: (1) common law 
protections, based on theories including privacy torts or the tort of misappropriation of name and 
likeness; and (2) statutory protections, with some state statutes addressing celebrity rights in 
considerable detail.78  There is no federal protection for the right of publicity; it is a right that 
exists at state level, either through statutes or common law.79 
The right of publicity is based on the tort of misappropriation and is related to a property 
right to name and likeness used for commercial purposes without consent.80  The right of 
publicity protects an individual’s name, image, signature, voice, likeness, and persona used for 
commercial purposes and advertising.81  It has been interpreted to include things, such as 
distinctive speaking or singing voices, nicknames, and other images or suggestions that may be 
enough to evoke a famous personality without actually showing his or her likeness.82  Like any 
other property right, the right of publicity can be licensed, assigned; and in some states, it can 
even last after a celebrity’s death and pass to heirs and legatees.83  This right exists separately 
 
70 Id. at 1125(c)(2)(B) 
71 Id. at 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi).  
72 Fact Sheets: Protecting a Trademark: Trademark Dilution. (January 25, 2020) 
https://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/Trademark-Dilution-(Intended-for-a-non-legal-
audience).aspx.  
73 Id.  
74 Corey Field, Entertainment Law: Fundamentals and Practice, 284 (1st ed. 2018) (citing Comedy III Productions, 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 299 (2001)).  
75 Id.  
76 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, (2d Cir. 1953). 
77 Id. at 868 
78 Corey Field, Entertainment Law: Fundamentals and Practice, 285 (1st ed. 2018). 
79 Id. at 285 n.12 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
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from rights that arise under trademark and copyright laws.84  The right of publicity can be 
invoked with other causes of action related to intellectual property rights.  For example, when a 
celebrity enforces his right of publicity under state law, he or she may also bring other causes of 
action under both state and federal laws, such as false endorsement under the Lanham Act, 
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, misappropriation under state law, unfair 
competition under state law and under the Lanham Act, and various forms of actions under state 
law rights of privacy, most notably “false light” claims.85 
The leading jurisdictions in this area of intellectual property rights are entertainment 
focused jurisdictions, including California and New York.86  Consequently, this Comment will 
examine the right of publicity in California.  Later, when addressing whether or not Leonard’s 
right of publicity is preempted by copyright law, this Comment will briefly examine Oregon’s 
right of publicity law, as that is where the lawsuit at issue has been moved to.  California’s right 
of publicity statute requires that someone “knowingly use another’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for the 
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or 
services, without such person’s prior consent.”87  Damages under the statute are broadly defined 
as actual damages, profits of the infringer less deductible expenses, and punitive damages.88  In 
addition to this, the award of attorneys’ fees and costs for the prevailing party are also included.89  
The person depicted must be actually identifiable in the infringing use for a right of publicity 
claim to prevail.90  “A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a photograph when 
one who views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably determine that the person 
depicted in the photograph is the same person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.”91  
One example of the “identifiable” standard can be found in the 1998 Ninth Circuit case, 
Newcombe v. Coors.  There, the Court held that a drawing of a baseball pitcher was sufficiently 
identifiable as the plaintiff because of his well-known pitching stance, despite the fact that it did 
not show his face.92  Based on this holding, it is clear that an image, such as a logo that depicts a 
well-known characteristic of a celebrity, can trigger a right of publicity claim. 
D. Right of Publicity and Related Causes of Action 
 As stated earlier, the right of publicity can be raised along with other federal causes of 
actions relating to intellectual property.  These causes of action derive from both trademark and 
copyright laws.  One common federal cause of action raised with the right of publicity is false 
endorsement under the Lanham Act.93  False endorsement occurs when a celebrity’s identity, his 
or her “mark,” is connected with a product or service in such a way that consumers are likely to 
 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a).  
88 Corey Field, Entertainment Law: Fundamentals and Practice, 289 (1st ed. 2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 
3344(a)).  
89 Id. (citing Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 50 (2006)).  
90 Id.  
91 Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(c).  
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be misled about the celebrity’s sponsorship or approval of the product or service.94  In false 
endorsement claims, the “mark” is the plaintiff’s identity.95  Courts consider consumer confusion 
to occur when consumers believe that the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated 
in some way, or when consumers make an incorrect mental association between the involved 
commercial products or their producers on the one hand and the celebrity on the other.96  Despite 
there being no federal cause of action for the right of publicity, a plaintiff may still get into 
federal court by raising the claim along with one of these related causes of action. 
E. Copyright Preemption of the Right of Publicity 
Under the Copyright Act, state law claims are preempted by federal copyright law.97  
Many right of publicity disputes involve copyrighted works, therefore courts often have to 
undergo a preliminary analysis to determine whether or not the right of publicity claim is 
preempted by federal copyright law.98  The Ninth Circuit has developed a two-part test, which is 
now widely adopted among the Circuits, to determine whether a state law claim such as a right of 
publicity claim is preempted by the Copyright Act.99  The Court first must determine whether the 
subject matter of the state law claim is in fact a copyright and covered under the Copyright 
Act.100  The Court must then determine whether the rights asserted under the state law are 
equivalent to the exclusive rights of a copyright holder under the Copyright Act.101  This means 
that for a right of publicity claim to survive copyright preemption, there has to be some “extra 
elements” of a right of publicity claim that would make it different from a copyright 
infringement claim.102 
 An example of copyright preemption of a right of publicity claim can be found in a 
Seventh Circuit lawsuit between the Baltimore Orioles and the Major League Baseball (MLB) 
Players Association.103  Baltimore Orioles, Inc. involves the longstanding dispute between 
professional baseball clubs and players over the ownership of broadcast rights of games.104  The 
clubs argued that the telecasts of games constituted copyrighted “works-made-for-hire,” which 
the baseball players had no rights in.105  The Court examined the telecasts of the games, and held 
that they were works-made-for-hire because: (1) the telecasts were fixed in a tangible form; (2) 
the telecasts were original works of authorship; and (3) the telecasts came within the subject 
 
94 Id. at 295. 
95 Id. at 295 (citing ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) and Landham v. Lewis Galoob 
Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2000)).  
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97 17 U.S.C. § 301(a): “All legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the 
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that a fixed in a tangible medium of 
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matter of copyrights.106  The Court held that since the players were employees of their respective 
professional clubs and their performances were within the scope of their employment with the 
clubs, the telecasts were works-made-for-hire, which the professional clubs had exclusive 
ownership over.107   
The players claimed that, while the professional clubs owned the copyrights in the 
telecasts of games, the broadcast of those telecasts without the players’ express consent violated 
the rights to publicity in their performances.108  The Court looked at two conditions that must be 
satisfied for preemption of a right under state law: (1) the work in which the right is asserted 
must be fixed in a tangible form and come within the subject matter of copyrights, and (2) the 
right must be equivalent to any of the rights specified in section 106 of the Copyright Act.109  
Since the Court had already held that the telecasts were copyrights owned by the owners, prong 
one was easily met.  The Court said, “as long as a work fits within one of the general subject 
matter categories of section 102 and 103 [of the Copyright Act], [section 301(a)] prevents the 
States from protecting it.”110   
Next the Court looked to whether the second prong for preemption was met, meaning: 
whether rights were equivalent to a right within the general scope of copyright law or if there 
were any extra elements.111  “A right is ‘equivalent’ to one of the rights within the general scope 
of copyright law if it is violated by the exercise of the rights set forth in section 106 [of the 
Copyright Act].”112  Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants the owner of the copyright the 
exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display the copyrighted work.113  This means 
that a right is equivalent to one of the rights comprised by a copyright if it is infringed by the 
mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display.114  The Court held that since the 
right of publicity in their performances was equivalent to the rights encompassed by copyright 
law, the players’ rights of publicity in their performances were preempted.115 
F. NBA Athletes and Intellectual Property 
 While the lawsuit between Kawhi Leonard and Nike, Inc. is unique in that it involved 
competing intellectual property protections, the courts are no strangers to the issues that 
professional athletes face when it comes to their intellectual property.  There have been several 
occasions where NBA athletes formally disputed intellectual property rights.  It is only fitting 
that one of the most prominent disputes over intellectual property involving an NBA athlete 
comes from one of the most dominant players the league has ever seen.116  This lawsuit, brought 
by Shaquille O’Neal over the “Shaqtus,” highlights a key argument available to athletes in 
intellectual disputes – the likelihood of consumer confusion. 
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1. Shaq and the “Shaqtus” 
 Shaquille O’Neal is a prominent former NBA player who obtained many trademarks in 
his name, image, and likeness to protect the word “Shaq” and other Shaq-formative marks.117  
Michael Calmese, owner and registered agent of an Arizona company called True Logo Fan, 
Inc.,  had created a character called the “Shaqtus,” which depicted a cactus with a man’s facial 
expression, wearing an orange basketball jersey with O’Neal’s number (#32), and bouncing a 
basketball.118  After discovering this “Shaqtus”character, O’Neal sued, bringing six different 
claims, including trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution.119  To 
prevail on a trademark infringement claim, a party must establish: (1) that it has a protectable 
ownership interest in the mark, and (2) that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause 
consumer confusion.120  The Court considered eight factors to determine whether consumer 
confusion is likely to occur: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of 
the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of good and 
the degree of care likely to be used by the consumer; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; 
and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.121   
 First the Court determined that the Shaq mark was both conceptually and commercially 
strong, and therefore this factor should weigh in favor of likelihood of confusion.122  It was 
conceptually strong because it was a coined term that did not exist in the English language.123  It 
was commercially strong because it had been used nationwide since the 1990’s to refer to 
O’Neal and the goods or services that originate from him and his company.124   
 The next factor the Court looked to was the “proximity of the goods,” which meant the 
relatedness of the goods at issue.125  The danger of related goods causing confusion is high 
because the public will likely look at related goods and mistakenly assume that they come from 
the same producer.126  Both goods were T-shirts: O’Neal sold T-shirts with the “Shaq” mark 
while Calamese sold T-shirts with the “Shaqtus” mark.127  The Court determined that since the 
products are identical in use and function, the factor should weigh in favor of likelihood of 
confusion.128 
 Next the Court looked at similarity between the marks.  “The greater the similarity 
between the marks at issue, the greater the likelihood of confusion.”129  The marks do not have to 
be exactly alike to be considered similar, notably.130  Typically, courts look to three factors to 
determine similarity between marks: sight, sound, and meaning.131  The Court again determined 
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118 Id. at 3.  
119 Id. at 5. 
120 Id. at 11. (quoting Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006).  
121 Id. at 13.  
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130 Id. 
131 Id. at 17 (quoting Sleekcraft, 599. F.2d at 351).  
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that this factor should weigh in favor of confusion because the two marks were similar in sight, 
sound, and meaning.132  The Court reasoned that they were similar in sight and sound because 
both marks began with the same four letters.133  Further, because both “Shaq” and “Shaqtus” 
have been used to refer to O’Neal, the marks had a similar meaning as well.134 
 The Court did not consider actual confusion because it lacked the necessary facts, and 
when it turned to the marketing channels used by both producers, the court determined that the 
factor was not of great significance.135  When looking to the type of goods and degree of care to 
be exercised by the consumer, the Court looked at how expensive the product was because 
consumers exercise more care in their purchasing decisions when buying expensive products.136  
T-shirts are inexpensive, so the Court determined that consumers would exercise little care when 
deciding to purchase them, which therefore would lead to consumer confusion.137   
 The Court next looked to the intent of the defendant in selecting the mark.138  The courts 
presume an intent to deceive the public when an infringer knowingly adopts a mark similar to 
another’s.139  The Court ruled that Calmese clearly intended to confuse the public because he had 
known of the “Shaq” mark’s existence and purposely created “Shaqtus” after O’Neal was traded 
to the Phoenix Suns and called “Shaqtus.”140  Fans and media alike referred to O’Neal as the 
“Shaqtus” connecting him to a cactus commonly found in Ariona, thus making confusion of the 
public easy to find.  
 While the Court determined that the eighth factor, “likelihood of expansion of product 
lines” was low, it determined that overall there was a high likelihood of consumer confusion.141  
Subsequently, the Court ruled in favor of Shaq on his trademark infringement claims.142 
G. Kawhi Leonard v. Nike, Inc.  
 In June of 2019, Kawhi Leonard first filed suit against Nike, Inc. over the rights to the 
“Klaw” logo.143  According to the Complaint, in 2011, Kawhi had authored a distinctive logo 
that included elements unique and meaningful to him, including a sketch of his large hands, as 
well as his initials “K.L.” and his basketball number.144  On October 26, 2011, Leonard entered 
into a contract agreement (“Nike Agreement”), which was for Leonard to provide “personal 
services and expertise in the sport of professional basketball and endorsement of the Nike brand 
and use of Nike products.”145  Nike had reached out to Leonard about making a unique logo for 
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him, but Leonard had rejected all of Nike’s proposals.146  Leonard had forwarded the logo that he 
had created back in 2011, and permitted Nike to use it during the term of the Nike Agreement as 
long as it was under his supervision and control.147  After much back and forth, Nike finally 
created a logo proposal, based off of Leonard’s original work, one that he approved of and 
allowed Nike to place on all merchandise during the term of the Nike Agreement.148 
 Leonard alleged that he had never transferred his rights to the logo to Nike at any time, 
and that Nike representatives had confirmed his ownership of the logo  by frequently referring to 
it as “Kawhi’s logo” and allowing Leonard to use the logo on non-Nike merchandise.149  Without 
Leonard’s knowledge or consent, Nike had filed for and obtained a registered copyright in the 
“Kawhi Leonard Logo.”150  After finding out about the copyright that Leonard believed Nike 
registered under false misrepresentations, Leonard obtained registered trademarks in his logo on 
November 9, 2017.151  Leonard had planned on using this logo for commercial purposes by 
affixing it on his merchandise and using it in connection with his charities and sports camps.152  
On December 21, 2018, John Matterazzo, Nike’s VP and Global Counsel for Sports Marketing, 
had written to Leonard informing him of Nike’s ownership in the logo pursuant to the Nike 
Agreement and demanded that Leonard stop using the logo.153  On January 30, 2019, Leonard 
responded to Nike, asking that Nike rescind its copyrights while informing the company that he 
owned trademarks protecting his ownership in the logo and that he was going to continue using 
the logo on his merchandise.154  
 On March 11, 2019, Nike sent a final response to Leonard, ordering him to cease and 
desist his use in the logo, stating it owned all intellectual property rights in the logo.155  After 
receiving Leonard’s complaint, Nike responded with affirmative defenses and counterclaims of 
its own.156  Nike’s second affirmative defense attacked Leonard’s ownership of the logo.157  Nike 
claimed that in the Nike Agreement, Leonard expressly acknowledged that Nike exclusively 
owns all interests in all intellectual property that is created by either Nike or Leonard in 
connection with the Nike Agreement.158  Nike further alleged that it is the exclusive owner of the 
“Klaw Design” because the design was developed by Nike’s designers on a “work for hire” 
basis.159 
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 In its counterclaims, Nike alleged that Leonard was attempting to “rewrite history” by 
asserting that he designed the “Klaw Design.”160  Nike claimed that Leonard himself 
acknowledged Nike’s design of the logo in an interview where he was quoted as saying, “I drew 
up the rough draft, sent it over, and they (Jordan Brand) made it perfect … I give the Jordan 
Brand team all of the credit because I am no artist at all … they refined it and made it look better 
than I thought it would ever be and I am extremely happy with the final version.”161  Nike further 
argues that Leonard was trying to pass off his original rough draft of his logo and Nike’s final 
version of the logo as the same product, when they are clearly distinct works.162 
 Additionally, Nike alleged that Leonard had improperly filed a U.S. Federal Trademark 
application for the use of the “Klaw Design” and fraudulently claimed to be the sole owner of the 
“Klaw Design” when applying for a registered copyright in the logo.163  In light of these 
allegations, Nike requested that the court: (1) enter a judgment declaring that Nike is the 
exclusive owner of the “Klaw Design; (2) enter a judgment against Leonard for infringing on 
Nike’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act to reproduce and distribute the “Klaw Design;” 
(3) enter a judgment against Leonard for committing fraud on the Copyright Office when 
applying for his registration; (4) enter a judgment against Leonard for breach of contract; (5) 
grant a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing Leonard from continuing to infringe on 
Nike’s exclusive rights in the Klaw Design; and (6) enter a judgment for an award of monetary 
damages suffered by Nike as a result of Leonard’s alleged infringement/breach of contract.164  
In Leonard’s complaint he sought a declaratory judgment that he was the sole owner of 
the logo, and that Nike committed fraud when registering the logo with the Copyright Office.  
On October 3rd, 2019, the court transferred this case out of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California to the District of Oregon, pursuant to a forum selection clause in 
the endorsement contract.165 
 
    III.  ANALYSIS   
 This section will analyze Leonard’s lawsuit, lay out the possible outcomes that could 
have come from this litigation, and then compare it with how the Court ruled.  To do this, it will 
be important to first look at the logo from a copyright standpoint.  Then, after determining who 
should have copyrights in the logo, it will be necessary to examine the Nike Agreement’s 
intellectual property ownership provision that Leonard agreed to in his endorsement deal.  
Separately, a brief glance at the right of publicity will be necessary to determine whether a 
possible right of publicity claim by Leonard would have been preempted by copyright law.  It 
will then be important to examine trademark law for possible recourse that may have been 
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available to Leonard.  After summarizing the realm of possibilities, this Comment will turn to the 
ruling by the Court and assess where each party stands after litigation. 
A. Copyrights in the “Klaw Logo” 
 At first glance, it is clear that Leonard has copyrights in the original logo that he first 
created and forwarded over to Nike.166  The original logo is not what is at issue here, however.  
The logo in question is the final version of Leonard’s original logo that was modified by Nike.  
Ownership of the copyrights in this modified logo will depend on exactly how drastically 
modified the final logo is from Leonard’s original.167  The Court could have viewed the 
modifications to Leoanrd’s original logo in three possible ways: (1) the modifications are not 
great enough to constitute an original work of authorship; (2) the logo is modified enough to 
represent an original work as a derivative work; or (3) the modifications are so great that the new 
logo is an entirely original work of authorship.168  Had the Court found that the logo was not 
modified enough to be considered an original work, then Leonard would be granted copyrights in 
both logos.  If, however, the Court determined that the modifications were great enough to 
conclude that the new logo is an original derivative work from Leonard’s original logo, then 
Nike would have rights to the new logo.169  Similarly, if it was determined that the modifications 
constituted a brand new original work, Nike would be granted ownership of the new logo.170  
B. The Contractual Language 
 While the three above scenarios each provide an answer to who has ownership of the 
copyright, the inquiry does not end there, as it is possible for someone to transfer the ownership 
of their copyrights through a contract.171  Therefore, a closer look at the intellectual property and 
ownership provision that Leonard agreed to in the Nike Agreement was necessary to determine 
where ownership should lie. According to Nike’s Answer, Leonard agreed to “Nike Standard 
Terms and Conditions,” which acknowledges Nike’s exclusive rights in intellectual property 
created pursuant to the Nike Agreement.172  Paragraph eight of those Standard Terms and 
Conditions states: 
“OWNERSHIP OF NIKE MARKS, DESIGNS & CREATIVES. 
CONSULTANT (a) acknowledges that NIKE exclusively owns all 
rights, title and interest in and to the NIKE Marks and that NIKE 
shall exclusively own all rights, title and interest in and to any 
logos, trademarks, service marks, characters, personas, copyrights, 
shoe or other product designs, patents, trade secrets or other forms 
of intellectual property created by NIKE (and/or its agents), 
CONSULTANT or ATHLETE in connection with this Contract; 
(b) shall completely cooperate with NIKE in its efforts to obtain 
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and maintain protection for such right, title and interest, including 
by promptly executing any documents as maybe required by NIKE 
in connection therewith; and (c) further acknowledges that after 
expiration or termination of this Contract, NIKE shall continue to 
have the unrestricted right to use (and without any 
CONSULTANT or ATHLETE approval) such intellectual 
property, including without limitation the right to re-issue a 
"signature" product previously associated with ATHLETE, 
provided that such post-contractual use shall not then include the 
ATHLETE Endorsement.”173 
 Parsing the exact language of the contract, it seems as though all rights in the newly – 
modified “Klaw Logo” should belong to Nike. A copyright is often described as a bundle of 
exclusive rights, each of which may be freely transferred.174  Among these exclusive rights are 
rights of reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, public performance and 
public display.175  The legal owner of these rights may transfer ownership through the use of an 
exclusive license.176  After reading the contract language quoted above, it seems as though 
Leonard  agreed to transfer his rights through an exclusive license via contract.  As a result, Nike 
should retain all copyrights in the logo pursuant to this provision because the modifications were 
made to the logo during the term of and in connection with the contract.  
C. Leonard’s Right of Publicity 
 An argument exists that Leonard’s logo plausibly meets all the necessary requirements 
for a right of publicity claim.  As stated earlier, the right of publicity protects an individual’s 
name, image, signature, voice, likeness, and persona used for commercial purposes and 
advertising.177  Leonard’s logo contains such distinct characteristics that are purely contributable 
to himself and his fame (his initials, basketball number, markedly giant hand), that it is very 
likely that a court would hold it to be sufficiently identifiable to trigger a right of publicity 
claim.178  If his logo was used on other products without his consent, Leonard would be able to 
recoup actual damages, profits Nike made off of the logo’s use, and perhaps even punitive 
damages.179  In order to determine whether or not a right of publicity claim is preempted by 
copyright law, one must look to the state’s right of publicity statute for any extra elements that 
are not encompassed by copyright law.180  This lawsuit was originally taking place in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of California, before it was transferred to the U.S District 
Court of Oregon pursuant to a forum selection clause in Leonard’s endorsement contract with 
Nike.181  This means that when looking at the right of publicity, one must look to Oregon state 
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law to determine whether or not a possible right of publicity claim is preempted by copyright 
law.182  This change in venue is fatal to any right of publicity claim that Leonard could make, as 
Oregon does not recognize the right of publicity at all.183  It is not known if Nike purposely 
chooses Oregon as its principal place of business in order to protect itself from right of publicity 
claims, but it is an effective strategy for a company that almost exclusively works with 
professional athletes.  Had this case stayed in California, it is likely that Kawhi Leonard’s right 
of publicity claim would not have been preempted by copyright law, as he would be contesting 
the use of his name and likeness in a commercial setting.184 
D. Recourse in Trademark Law 
 While it seems as though Leonard is caught in a losing battle, there may still be recourse 
in trademark law.  Leonard could potentially counter by alleging dilution of his mark.185  To 
support his claim, Leonard can cite Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd, an 
analysis of which will prove beneficial to this argument.186  In that case, National Football 
League (“NFL”)  franchise, the Indianapolis Colts, sued the Canadian Football League’s 
(“CFL”) “Baltimore CFL Colts” for trademark infringement.187  Prior to moving to Indianapolis, 
the Colts were located in Baltimore and known as the “Baltimore Colts.”188  The Baltimore Colts 
organization was one of the most well-known franchises in NFL history.189  Nine years after the 
Baltimore Colts moved to Indianapolis and changed their name to the Indianapolis Colts, the 
CFL granted Baltimore a franchise which they named “Baltimore Colts.”190  Both the NFL and 
Indianapolis Colts sought an injunction preventing the new team from using the name “Colts,” 
“Baltimore Colts,” and “Baltimore CFL Colts” in connection with the playing of professional 
football, the broadcast of football games, and the sale of merchandise to football fans and other 
buyers.191  
 The Court set out to determine whether or not “Baltimore CFL Colts” was confusingly 
similar to the “Indianapolis Colts,” by virtue of the history of the Indianapolis Colts and the 
overlapping product and geographical markets served by both the Indianapolis and Baltimore 
CFL Colts.192  First, the Court looked to whether or not confusion was possible between the two 
marks.193  The Court held that confusion was possible because consumers who do not regularly 
watch football could turn on a Baltimore CFL Colts game thinking they are watching an 
“original” Baltimore Colts game.194  Consumers could also buy Baltimore CFL Colts 
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merchandise and reasonably think they are buying “original” Baltimore Colts merchandise, per 
the Court.195  This would take away revenue from both the NFL and Indianapolis Colts and thus 
result in a trademark infringement, the judge explained.  
 After determining that it was possible for confusion to arise amongst consumers, the 
Court then looked to whether or not confusion was likely.196  The Court noted that the legal 
standard under the Lanham Act is “whether it is likely that the challenged mark, if permitted to 
be used by the defendant, would cause the plaintiff to lose a substantial number of customers.”197 
Both the Indianapolis Colts and Baltimore CFL Colts presented experts and surveys in attempts 
to prove the likelihood or unlikelihood of confusion between the marks, respectively.198 
Ultimately, the Indianapolis Colts prevailed and the Court held that permitting the defendants to 
keep their mark would cause confusion among consumers and lead to the Indianapolis Colts 
losing business.199 
Keeping Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. in mind, it is 
seemingly clear that there will be consumer confusion if Nike is permitted to use Leonard’s 
“Klaw logo” on their merchandise.  Over the course of his NBA career, Leonard has quickly 
become one of the most recognizable NBA athletes, and attentive fans of the sport know him for 
his incredibly large hands.200  The “Klaw Logo” contains Kawhi’s initials (K.L.), as well as the 
basketball number long associated with him, and a depiction of a large hand.201  It can be argued 
that anyone who is familiar with basketball would easily recognize this logo as being associated 
with NBA superstar Leonard. In fact, because of the uniqueness of both the logo and its relation 
to Leonard, the logo really cannot be associated with anyone else.  Thus, the Court should be 
persuaded to grant Leonard ownership of the trademark for the logo.  By allowing Nike to 
maintain ownership of the mark and use of it in commerce, consumer confusion would inevitably 
result because consumers could only associate it with Leonard.202  A ruling by the Court granting 
Leonard ownership of the trademark could restrict Nike from using the mark for sale in 
commerce. Despite this possible ruling, Leonard would still not be able to use the logo because 
doing so would infringe on Nike’s copyrights.  While this seems like a loss, Leonard still owns 
the copyright to his original logo because he had personally created that logo before his contract 
with Nike.  Leonard could modify this original into a derivative work that is distinct enough 
from the Nike created “Klaw Design,” thus relieving him from further issues with Nike.  
E. Outcome of the Case 
 On April 22nd, 2020, U.S. District Judge Michael W. Mosman ruled against Leonard’s 
claim for ownership of the “Klaw Logo.”203  While an official opinion is yet to be written, Judge 
Mosman has revealed his reasoning for denying Leonard’s claim.  Judge Mosman held that the 
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“Klaw Logo” that Nike created, despite Leonard’s help, is an independent piece of intellectual 
property.204  He ruled, “it is not merely a derivative work of the sketch itself …. I do find it to be 
new and significantly different from the design.”205  Looking at the logos side by side, one may 
find it hard to consider the two “significantly different,” but Judge Mosman believes that the 
modifications done to Leonard’s original logo constitutes a brand new original work.  Believing 
that allowing Leonard’s Complaint to be amended would be futile, Judge Mosman dismissed 
Leonard’s claim with prejudice.206  A dismissal with prejudice is a final determination on the 
merits of the case, meaning Leonard is forbidden from filing another suit based on the same 
grounds.207  
While things seem bleak for Leonard, his attorneys are still evaluating all of the options 
available to protect Leonard’s interests.208  Leonard likely has two remaining options: (1) appeal 
this ruling in hopes that an appellate judge will view the modifications differently, or (2) 
abandon the fight and create a brand new logo.  Whether Leonard decides to continue this fight 
or not may very well depend on how Judge Mosman rules on Nike’s other counterclaims.  If 
Judge Mosman rules against Leonard on the breach of contract and fraud claims, and, as a result, 
awards Nike damages, Leonard may believe it to be worth fighting further. 
 
    IV.  IMPACT 
 The outcome of this case reveals a lot about trademark and copyright law and provides 
athletes with better information on how to protect their interests in intellectual property.  This 
case highlights the hurdles that athletes will face when they want to expand their personal brand 
beyond that of an endorsement deal.  The Court’s denial of the injunction Leonard sought to 
prevent Nike from using the “Klaw Logo” on its merchandise, despite the logo’s close 
association to Leonard, is a blow to athletes around the world seeking to grow their brands.  
After examining the facts of this case and analyzing the relevant laws, one cannot help but feel 
that it was the wrong outcome. It is likely that Nike will never use the “Klaw Logo” again.  It 
appears, having exclusive ownership of the copyright, Nike will either shelf the logo or request 
that Leonard pay a large sum of money for permission to use the logo on his products.  This 
Court’s decision, which allows Nike to essentially force Leonard to buy back the rights for the 
use of his logo, will likely leave those paying close attention to this suit dissatisfied.  Allowing 
Nike to maintain control of the logo in commerce muddies the lines of intellectual property 
protection and leaves observers with more questions than answers.  Further, a decision like this 
seems to go against the basic principles of trademark law by promoting confusion in the 
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marketplace.209  This decision highlights deficiencies in our intellectual property law that now 
must be addressed.  
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office should not be able to register trademarks in works 
that are currently registered as copyrights by other people without the express written consent of 
the owner of the registered copyright.  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has an examiner 
who checks to ensure that the applicant is properly entitled to register the mark, but seemingly 
concurrent protections are not included in that search.210  In addition to this, the U.S. Copyright 
Officer also erred by granting Leonard registration for copyrights in the same “Klaw Design” 
that Nike had already registered.211  By registering Leonard’s copyrights in the logo, the United 
States Copyright Officer falsely confirmed Leonard’s belief that he was the true owner of the 
“Klaw Logo.”  This belief led Leonard to use the logo on his personal merchandise which may 
ultimately result in Leonard suffering damages for a breach of contract.  Without these necessary 
safeguards in place, it is impossible for athletes to truly know if they are infringing on another’s 
work while pursuing their own intellectual property gain.  These minor changes to the current 
system could have prevented Leonard’s dispute from getting this far and saved the large amounts 
of money and judicial resources that were spent resolving the case.  If change does not occur, 
athletes will never truly know that their intellectual property is protected, and many may find 
themselves similarly situated as Leonard – clawing for protection. 
 
209 See A.J. Canfield Co., v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304 (3rd Cir. 1986) (Stating that trademarks provide a short 
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